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Abstract
This paper considers a nancing problem for an innovative rm that
is considering launching a web-based platform. Our model is the rst
one that analyzes an entrepreneurs choice between security tokens (via a
security token o¤ering (STO)) and utility tokens (via initial coin o¤ering
(ICO)). The entrepreneur on one hand faces a large degree of demand
uncertainty on his product and on the other hand has to deal with incen-
tive problems of professional blockchain participants who contribute to
the development and sales of the product. We argue that utility tokens
with prot rights are a better option for the rm compared to straight
utility tokens or security tokens because they help the rm better deal
with both the moral hazard problems (via prot sharing incentives) and
demand uncertainty (they help the rm learn the product demand). This
nding is consistent with some recent evidence. The paper also generates
new predictions that have not been tested sofar.
Keywords: Entrepreneurial Finance; Blockchain; Initial Coin O¤ering;
Security Token O¤ering; Moral Hazard; Demand Uncertainty; FinTech
JEL Codes: D82, G32, L11, L26, M13
1 Introduction
Innovative companies account for a signicant share of the global market for
human capital but they are often constrained in their growth potential as they
have di¢culty accessing capital markets (Hall (2009)). Blockchain-based initial
coin o¤erings (ICOs) and security token o¤erings (STOs) promised to provide
a new source of nancing for such rms. The ICO phenomenon dates back to
2013. Since then, the number and funding of projects has been growing expo-
nentially, with over $20 billion raised by December 2018 (Coinschedule, 2018).
In a typical ICO, an entrepreneur raises capital by pre-selling utility tokens
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which give their owners the right to use the companys product or service once
it is developed. In 2017, the next step was taken. Fintech companies started to
use STOs to nance their projects. In security token o¤erings (STOs),1 com-
panies sell tokenized traditional nancial instruments, like, for example, equity
where tokenholders receive rights on a rms future prots.2 The number of
STOs is quickly growing. In January 2018 5 STOs were conducted (monthly)
while in November/December 2018 there were more than 20 per month and it
continues to grow.3
ICO and STO research is quickly growing. Most papers are focused on ICOs.
Theoretical papers on ICOs include, amomg others, Catalini and Gans (2018), Li
and Mann (2018), Govindan and Wilson (2009), Bakos and Ha laburda (2018),
Cong and Wang (2018), Lee and Parlour (2018), Garratt and van Oordt (2019)
and Miglo (2020a). Reserach on STOs and utility tokens with prot-sharing
rights is in its early stages and as we are writing this article it includes several
emprical papers (eg. Adhami, Giudici and Martinazzi (2017) and Ante and
Fiedler (2019)) but no theoretical paper to the best of our knowledge. Respec-
tively no paper is focused on the choice between ICO, STO and etc. eventhough
for many entrepreneurs this issue seems to be very important.4 In this article
we shed some light on these unexplored questions namely what are economic
ideas behind issuing security tokens or utility tokens with prot rights and how
rms select between di¤erent types of tokens.
Our model builds on the following observations. First, ICOs and STOs are
characterized by an environement with high uncertainty. A lot of campaigns fail
or turn out to be low quality or even fraud in some cases.5 Firm success in these
innovative areas depends crucially on the incentives and e¤orts of not only the
rm itself but on many particpants invloved. For example, an interesting case
is Filecoin, which is setting up a network to allow peer-to-peer storage space
sharing. Their success depends on action and strategies of so-called miners who
are expected to be active participants of their platform. Token design issued
by the platform may a¤ect the incentives of parties involved. For example,
in the case of Filecoin, miners purchase tokens during the pre-sale.6 Second,
tokens serve as a learning tool for entrepreneurs regarding market demand. By
observing the demand for tokens during the initial sale of tokens or by observing
1 In contrast to utility tokens, security tokens are regulated. The legal structures continue
to evolve. In the US, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) applies
the Howey test to determine whether an asset qualies as a security. Essentially, investments
are considered securities if money is invested, the investment is expected to yield a prot, the
money is invested in a common enterprise and any prot comes from the e¤orts of a promoter
or third party (Ante and Fiedler (2019)).
2Ante and Fiedler (2019).
3https://hackernoon.com/will-2019-be-the-year-of-the-sto-understanding-stos-security-
tokens-market-potential-over-icos-4d2502227220
4See, for example, https://blog.polymath.network/minthealth-and-polymath-bring-the-
rst-healthcare-security-token-to-revolutionize-healthcare-a36884f17e4e
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2019/06/04/a-conversation-with-carlos-domingo-ceo-
and-co-founder-securitize/
5See, for example, OECD (2019).
6https://coincentral.com/lecoin-beginners-guide-largest-ever-ico/
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the token market price, the entrepreneur can learn "crowd wisdom" regarding
the platform and its products. Finally, tokens have secondary markets (see,
for example, the interview with BlockState CEO Paul Claudius7) unlike, for
example, venture capital investments. This feature of tokens makes it also
di¤erent from crowdfunding which typically does not have a secondary market
for investments made by funders.8
In our model an entrepreneur with an innovative idea considers launching
a web-based platform for an innite number of periods. The demand for the
product is highly uncertain so the entrepreneur can make production decisions
without learning demand or it can issue tokens prior to making production deci-
sions. The success of the platform also crucially depends on the e¤ort provided
by the entrepreneurs and blochchain participants (miners) during the develop-
ment stage. In order to nance the development of the platform, the entrepre-
neur can issue tokens. Utility tokens give the right to purchase a product or
service on the platform while security tokens give a right on rm prot. The
"wisdom of the crowd" aspect of a platform kicks in when the rm is facing
demand uncertainty. Without utility tokens, production (and repsectively pric-
ing) decisions of the rm are not optimal. Usage of utility tokens helps the
rm to learn the demand and improve its decision-making including production
(pricing) decisions. However the shortcoming of utility tokens is that they do
not provide much incentive for miners to develop the product. On the other
hand security tokens to not provide a exible tool for learning market demand.
We then analyze the trade-o¤ between security tokens and utility tokens for the
entrepreneur. We show, for example, that the utility tokens will be preferred if
the degree of unceratinty regarding market demand is higher (it increases the
learning value of utility tokens).
Next we include utility tokens with proft rights into the basic model. We
demonstrate that this type of token dominates regular utility tokens (i.e. with-
out prot rights) or security tokens. Learning opportunities in terms of demand
for this kind of token still exists which makes it similar to utility tokens without
prot rights. Also in contrast to utility tokens without prot rights, they do a
better job of incentivizing miners during the development stage.
Our model provides several predictions most of which have not been tested
sofar. Interestingly though, one of our main predictions namely that utility to-
kens with prot rights can dominate utility tokens without this right is consistent
with recent empirical evidence. In a subsample of 253 campaigns, Adhami et
al (2017) document higher returns when tokens allow contributors to access a
specic service including prot rights. Our results also provide several implica-
tions for policymakers and practitioners. First, it explains factors that should
be taken into account by managers designing optimal token design for their
rms. Secondly it can help di¤erent platforms hosting ICOs and STOs compare
the suitability of the di¤erent types of tokens with a variety of business factors,
7http://www.bcointalk.com/investing/Block-state-CEO-Paul-Claudius-in-an-Interview-
In-Switzerland-it-is-much-easier-to-STO-than-they-have-been-in-Germany-h1524.html
8See, for example, https://tokenomica.com/blog/security-token-o¤ering-as-an-alternative-
to-crowdinvesting/
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which ultimately can help platforms deal with di¤erent issuers and minimize
risks (maximize quality).
KuCoin CEO Michael Gan explains that the advantage of why his business
is doing relatively well compared to its competitors and why its tokens have an
active and growing market is that their tokens have both utility value and prot
sharing rights. It helps on one hand to provide all services to customers but also
ensures nancial incentives even when markets seems to be bearish. "...As the
native token of KuCoin, KCS holders now can enjoy trading fee discount and
daily KCS bonus on our platform. ....Also, KCS has gradually been accepted
by increasing number of industry partners. You can now use KCS to get a
loan on ETHLend, transfer KCS to your friends on Adamant Messenger, pay
private expenses with KCS through Aave pay. More use cases will be unveiled
this quarter." In many articles KCS is named one of the best dividend paying
tokens so it has aspects of both utility tokens and security tokens.9 There
are many other examples of cryptobusinesses that use similar ideas including
Binance, Medpath, XWIN, Elephant, Props, Treecoin, XOV etc.
Garratt et al (2019) study the e¤ect of entrepreneurial moral hazard on
ICO outcomes and nd conditions for when an ICO is a better choice than
traditional debt or venture capital. Compared to Garratt et al (2019), we also
study the incentives of other blockchain participants related to moral hazard
problems. In Catalini et al (2018) an ICO allows an entrepreneur to generate
buyer competition for the token, which, in turn, reveals consumer value without
the entrepreneurs having to know, ex ante, consumer willingness to pay. In our
paper, on the other hand, tokens can help entrepreneur learn market demand in
each period by observing the token price on the secondary market. Compared
to the papers mentioned above, we also study STO and utility tokens with prot
rights.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model and some preliminary results. Section 3 provides an anlysis for the model
with moral hazard and demand uncertainty. Section 4 analyzes the role of utility
tokens with prot sharing rights. Section 5 discusses the consistency of the
models predictions with observed empirical evidence. Section 6 discusses the
models robustness and its potential extensions and Section 7 is a conclusion to
the study.
9https://www.cryptosquawk.com/kucoin-shares-review-the-dividend-paying-exchange-
token/
https://www.kucoin.com/news/en-michael-ama-tron-community-exchanges-are-naturally-
for-staking-services
https://medium.com/altcoin-magazine/interview-with-michael-gan-ceo-of-kucoin-
ae0b089e2a0b
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKlPiw943yI&t=34s
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2 The Model Description and Some Preliminar-
ies
An innovative rm has monopoly power over its idea of creating a website plat-
form selling a product/service for an innite number of periods. The plat-
forms quality depends on the e¤ort provided by the entrepreneur (e1) and the
blockchain participants (we call them miners for shortness) (e2). The cost of ef-
fort is
e2j
2 , j = 1; 2.
10 During the operational stages of the platform, the demand
for product in each period is expected to be driven by the following demand
function: q = v   p, where p is the price, q is the quantity demanded. In each
period v can be either high (vh) or low (vl). The probability of high demand is
. Let n be the rms operational prot in period n and  is the discount fac-
tor. Respectively E(e1; e2)
P
n
n
(1+)n is the present value of the rms earnings
where E(e1; e2) is a factor that reects the platforms quality. We assume
E(e1; e2) = e1 + e2 (1)
The calculations of n as well as the way the rms earnings will be distributed
depend on the rms nancing strategy. To nance the development of the
product the rm can sell tokens. Tokens may vary in design. They can be
utility tokens which give the tokenholder the right to purchase the product on
the platform. They can also be security tokens which give tokenholders prot
sharing rights. The rm is owned by an entrepreneur.
Utility tokens. Initially, i.e. before the platform is launched, the rm sells
tokens to miners for the price p0.
11 The total number of tokens is normalized to
unity without loss of generality. As we will see, the relative fractions of tokens
owned by the entrepreneur, miners and public are important. After the rst
issue of tokens is sold, the entrepreneur and the miners provide their e¤orts.
Miners then trade tokens on the secondary market. After that the platform is
launched. In each period, the entrepreneur sells tokens received for selling the
product in the previous period. After that he determines the level of production.
At the end of each period the produced items are exchanged for tokens.
Security tokens. The rm selects the fraction of equity  that will belong
to security token holders and sells them during the STO to miners. After that
the entrepreneur and miners select their production e¤orts. The platform is
launched for an innite number of periods. In each period, the rm produces its
products/services and sells them to the public. The rms earnings are distrib-
uted pro-rata according to the number of tokens owned by each tokenholder.
First consider the symmetric information scenarios without moral hazard
problems for the di¤erent types of tokens. We assume that v is given and the
quality of platform E is also given and equals 1 for simplicity and it does not
depend on any e¤orts made by the entrepreneur or miners.
10 In Section 6 we discuss the models assumptions including the ways of modelling moral
hazard, risk-aversion etc..
11They can be paid for with at money and a cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Euther etc.
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2.1 Utility tokens
The timing of events is present in Figure 1.
-
t = 0 t = 1 :::t = n:::
s s s
Firm sells tokens to
miners
p0 is determined
Miners sell their tokens on
the secondary market for
the price p1
The platform is launched
The rm determines q1
Products are sold to
the public for tokens
The entrepreneur sells tokens on
the secondary market for the price pn
The rm determines qn
Tokens are exchanged for products
for the price Tn per item (in tokens)
Figure 1. The sequence of events for utility tokens.
We begin the solution by working backwards. Consider the operational stage.
In period n, the entrepreneur sells tokens for the price pn. After tokens are sold,
the rm determines qn. Tokenholders then use their tokens to buy products.
Equilibrium is determined by the following conditions: 1) after selling tokens
the rm maximizes its prot in tokens (since tokens are the only medium of
exchange on the platform), which equals qnTn (production-incentive constraint)
2) demand equilibrium:
qn = v   Pn (2)
where Pn is the cost of the product for the public:
Pn = Tnpn (3)
Taking into account (2) and (3), the entrepreneurs objective function can be
written as (v qn)qn
pn
. The optimal qn equals (note that by the time the production
decision should be made, tokens are sold and pn is determined)
qn =
v
2
(4)
and the entrepreneurs prot (in tokens) equals:
v2
4pn
From (2) and (4) we have:
Pn =
v
2
6
This implies a non-arbitrage condition for consumers (i.e the cost of tokens for
consumers (pn) equals the cost of products o¤ered by the entrepreneur taking
into account the demand function):
v
2
= Tnpn
Token market equilibrium (supply equals demand) is described by the following
condition:
qnTn = 1
This implies:
Tn =
2
v
pn = n =
v2
4
The present value of the rms prots equals  =
P
n
n
(1+)n and the present
value of the entrepreneurs earnings equals
v2
4
 
v2
4(1 + )
=
v2
4(1 + )
(5)
The second term is substracted because the entrepreneur does not sell tokens
during period 1 (it is done by the miners; note that without moral hazard the
results would not change if the entrepreneur sold it directly to the public).
At the beginning of period 1, miners sell their tokens on the secondary market
for the value:
p1 =
v2
4
When selling tokens, the entrepreneurs total prot is:
p0 +
v2
4(1 + )
under the condition that miners prots covers their investment costs
p1
1 + 
=
v2
4(1 + )
 p0
We assume that there is a large number of miners so they agree to invest an
amount equal to the present value of their future prots. The entrepreneurs
total prot equals
 =
v2
4(1 + )
+
v2
4(1 + )
=
v2
4
(6)
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2.2 Security tokens
The timing of events is presented in Figure 2.
-
t = 0 t = 1 :::t = n:::
s s s
Firm selects  and
sells tokens
to miners
p0 is determined
Miners sell their tokens on
the secondary market for
the price p1
The platform is launched
The rm determines q1
Products are sold
to the public
The rm determines qn
Products are sold to !the! public
Figure 2. The sequence of events for security tokens.
Consider the operational stage. In period n there are qn items produced.
The rms objective function can be written as (v qn)qn. The optimal q equals
qn =
v
2
and the entrepreneurs prot equals:
(1  )v2
4
The present value of the entrepreneurs prots equals  =
P
n
(1 )pnqn
(1+)n
(1  )v2
4
The miners prot equals:
v2
4
When choosing , the entrepreneur maximizes:
p0 +
(1  )v2
4
under the condition that the miners prot covers their investment cost
p0 =
v2
4
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The entrepreneurs total prot equals then
 =
v2
4
+
(1  )v2
4
=
v2
4
(7)
Lemma 1. Without moral hazard and demand uncertainty, the rm is
indi¤erent between the di¤erent types of tokens.
Proof. Follows from the comparison of (6) and (7).
This result is not surprising given that in the absence of any nancial market
imperfections every type of nancing should have the same result (similar to
Modigliani-Miller proposition (1958)).
3 Product Development, Market Uncertainty and
Incentives
In this section we analyze the role of moral hazard and market uncertainty on
the rms choice of tokens. The entrepreneur and miners provide e¤orts in the
development stage of the platform that a¤ect its quality. The token design
a¤ects the incentives of all the parties involved. Also the market demand for
platform products is uncertain. The token design a¤ects the platform ability
to learn information about market demand before the entrepreneur makes his
production decisions.
The timing of events for utility tokens is present in Figure 3.
-
t = 0 t = 1 :::t = n:::
s s s
Firm sells tokens to
miners
p0 is determined
The entrepreneur
selects e1
and miners select e2
Miners sell their tokens on
the secondary market for
the price p1
The platform is launched
The rm determines q1
Products are sold to
the public for tokens
The entrepreneur sells tokens
for the price pn and learns vn
The rm determines qn
Tokens are exchanged for products
for the price Tn per item (in tokens)
Figure 3. The sequence of events with moral hazard and market
uncertainty for utility tokens.
The timing of events for security tokens is present in Figure 4.
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-
t = 0 t = 1 :::t = n:::
s s s
Firm selects 
and sells tokens
to miners
p0 is determined
The entrepreneur
selects e1
and miners select e2
Miners sell their tokens on
the secondary market for
the price p1
The platform is launched
The rm determines q1
Products are sold to
the public
The rm determines qn
Products are sold to public
Figure 4. The sequence of events with moral hazard and market
uncertainty for security tokens.
We will proceed in 3 steps. First we will consider the case with moral hazard
without market unceratinty. Next we will consider the implications of market
uncertainty and nally we will consider them together.
3.1 Moral hazard
We start with utility tokens.
3.1.1 Utility tokens
We begin the solution by working backwards. Consider the operational stage.
Similarly to the previous section, we get that the present value of the entrepre-
neurs prots equals
E(e1; e2)(
v2
4
 
v2
4(1 + )
)
The di¤erence with the previous case is that the quality of the platform was
given but here it depends on e¤orts provided by the entrepreneur and miners.
At the beginning of period 1, miners sell their tokens on the secondary market
for the value:
p1 = E(e1; e2)
v2
4
At n = 0, the entrepreneur chooses e1 to maximize
E(e1; e2)(
v2
4
 
v2
4(1 + )
) 
e21
2
Taking into account (1), this equals
(e1 + e2)v
2
4
 
(e1 + e2)v
2
4(1 + )
 
e21
2
(8)
10
Optimal e1 equals:
e1 =
v2
4(1 + )
(9)
Miners chose e2 to maximize their discounted earnings from selling tokens at
t = 1 minus the cost of e¤ort:
p1
1 + 
 
e22
2
= E(e1; e2)
v2
4(1 + )
 
e22
2
Taking into account (1), this equals
(e1 + e2)v
2
4(1 + )
 
e22
2
(10)
Optimal e2 equals:
e2 =
v2
4(1 + )
(11)
(9) and (11) imply
e1 + e2 =
v2
4
(12)
It implies that (8) equals:
v4
162
 
v4
16(1 + )
 
v4
322(1 + )2
=
(1 + 2)v4
322(1 + )2
And (10) equals
v4
16(1 + )
 
v4
32(1 + )2
=
(2 + )v4
32(1 + )2
When selling tokens, the entrepreneurs total prot is:
p0 +
(1 + 2)v4
322(1 + )2
under the condition that miners net prot covers the investment cost
p0 =
(2 + )v4
32(1 + )2
(13)
The entrepreneurs total prot equals then
 =
(2 + )v4
32(1 + )2
+
(1 + 2)v4
322(1 + )2
=
(1 + 4 + 2)v4
322(1 + )2
(14)
11
3.1.2 Security tokens
Similar to Section 2, the present value of the entrepreneurs prots from opera-
tions equals
E(e1; e2)(1  )v
2
4
The entrepreneur chooses e1 to maximize
E(e1; e2)(1  )v
2
4
 
e21
2
Taking into account (1), this equals
(1  )(e1 + e2)v
2
4
 
e21
2
(15)
Optimal e1 equals:
e1 =
(1  )v2
4
(16)
The miners chose e2 to maximize:
v2
4
 
e22
2
=
(e1 + e2)v
2
4
 
e22
2
(17)
The optimal e2 equals:
e2 =
v2
4
(18)
(16) and (18) imply
e1 + e2 =
v2
4
It implies that (15) equals:
(1  )(e1 + e2)v
2
4
 
e21
2
=
(1  )(1 + )v4
322
And (17) equals
(e1 + e2)v
2
4
 
e22
2
=
(2  )v4
322
When choosing , the entrepreneur maximizes:
 = p0 +
(1  )(1 + )v4
322
subject to
p0 =
(2  )v4
322
It implies
 =
(2  )v4
322
+
(1  )(1 + )v4
322
=
(1 + 2  22)v4
322
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Optimal
 =
1
2
and entrepreneurs prot equals
 =
3v4
642
(19)
Lemma 2. Under moral hazard, the entrepreneurs prot when the rm
issues security tokens is higher than with utility tokens.
Proof. Follows from the comparison of (14) and (19). Indeed the di¤erence
between them can be written as 3v
4
642
 
(1+4+2)v4
322(1+)2
= (1 )
2v4
642(1+)2
> 0.
The idea behind Lemma 2 is that miners are better incentivized with security
tokens. Miners receive part of the rms prot for a long period of time and
if this part is su¢ciently high they provide a higher level of e¤ort than with
utility tokens. The entrepreneurs e¤ort is reduced but not by much since the
entrepreneur keeps a large fraction of equity in any case for a long period of
time in the company. Most importantly when maximizing his objective function
initially, the entrepreneur has exibility in terms of selecting the optimal fraction
of equity for selling to miners by taking into account the cost of the miners e¤ort
and his own cost. As one can see from (16) and (18), the entrepreneur and
the miners prots depend on the fraction of prots o¤ered to security token
holders. With a proper selection of the fraction of prot o¤ered to security
token hoders, the rm can provide a good combination of incentives in the case
of security token issues. Under utiltiy tokens the entrepreneur does not have
much exibility in managing the levels of e¤orts since utility tokens do not give
their holders a long-term fraction of the rms equity so the level of incentives
that can be induced with utility tokens is smaller than it is with security tokens.
3.2 Demand uncertainty
Here we assume that in each period the demand for the product o¤ered by the
platform is either vh with probability  or vl. Issuing utility tokens helps the
entrepreneur learn the demand and helps with production decisions.
3.2.1 Utility tokens
Consider the operational stage. In the beginning of each stage product demand
is unknown to the entrepreneur (vn equals vh with probability  and vl with
probability 1   ). In period n, the entrepreneur sells tokens for the price
pn. After tokens are sold, the rm determines qn. Tokenholders then use their
tokens to buy products for the price Tn (in tokens). Equilibrium is determined
by the following conditions: 1) after selling tokens the rm maximizes its prot
in tokens, which equals qnTn;
2) demand:
qn = vj   Pn; j = l; h (20)
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where Pn is the cost of the product to the public
Pn = Tnpn (21)
Taking into account (20) and (21), the entrepreneurs objective function can
be written as
(vj qn)qn
pn
. The optimal qn equals
qn =
vj
2
and the entrepreneurs prot (in tokens) equals:
v2j
4pn
Also note that we have:
Pn =
vj
2
This implies a non-arbitrage condition for consumers:
vj
2
= Tnpn
Token market equilibrium:
qnTn = 1
This implies:
Tn =
2
vj
pn = n =
v2j
4
The present value of the rms prots equals
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
 
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
=
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
The latter term is subtracted because the entrepreneur does not sell tokens
during period 1.
In period 1, miners sell their tokens on the secondary market for the value:
p1 =
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
When selling tokens, the entrepreneurs total prot is:
 = p0 +
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
subject to
p0 =
p1
1 + 
=
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
It implies
 =
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
+
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
=
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
(22)
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3.2.2 Security tokens
Consider the operational stage. In period n the rm produces qn items. The
price of the item depends on the market demand. If it is vh the price equals
pn = vh   qn and if it is vl the price equals pn = vl   qn. When making its
production decision, the rm maximizes its expected prot. The rms objective
function can be written as (vh + (1  )vl   qn)qn. Optimal q equals
qn =
vh + (1  )vl
2
and the entrepreneurs prot equals:
(1  )(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
The present value of the entrepreneurs prots equals
(1  )(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
The miners prot equals:
(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
When choosing , the entrepreneur maximizes:
 = p0 +
(1  )(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
subject to
p0 =
(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
It implies
 =
(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
+
(1  )(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
=
(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
(23)
Lemma 3. Under demand uncertainty, the entrepreneurs prot when the
rm issues utility tokens is higher than it is when the rm issues security tokens.
Proof. Follows from the comparison of (22) and (23). Indeed the di¤erence
between them can be written as
v2h+(1 )v
2
l
4  
(vh+(1 )vl)
2
4 =
(1 )(vh vl)
2
4 >
0.
The idea behind Lemma 3 is that the rm learns the market demand when
selling utility tokens, which were collected in the previous period, on the sec-
ondary market at the beginning of each period. This is consitent with the idea
of learning via "crowd wisdom".
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3.3 Moral Hazard and Demand Uncertainty
In this section we analyze token design when market uncertainty and moral
hazard are both present.
Proposition 1. Under moral hazard and demand uncertainty, the rms
prot if it issues utility tokens equals
(1 + 4 + 2)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
(24)
If the rm issues security tokens, its prot equals
 =
3(vh + (1  )vl)
4
642
(25)
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Naturally, prot in either case increases with the expected demand (vh, vl
and ) and and decreases with the discount factor .
Proposition 2. The likelihood of selecting utility tokens increases (respec-
tively the likelihood of selecting security tokens decreases) when  increases from
0 to vl
vl+vh
and decreases when  increases from vl
vl+vh
to 1; when  increases;
for a given value of vl is positively correlated with the di¤erence between vh and
vl.
Proof. We need to compare (24) and (25). The former is greater when
3(vh + (1  )vl)
4
642
>
(1 + 4 + 2)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
or
3(1 + )2
1 + 4 + 2
>
2(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
(vh + (1  )vl)4
(26)
The derivative of right-hand side (RHS; respectivelly LHS will be used for left-
hand side) of (26) in  equals:
(vh   vl)(vh + (1  )vl)(
vl
vl+vh
  )
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
(27)
which proves the rst part of the proposition. Indeed, the sign of (27) is deter-
mined by the sign of vl
vl+vh
  . It is positive when  < vl
vl+vh
and is negative
otherwise. The derivative of LHS of (26) in  equals 6(1+)
2
(1+4+2)2
, which proves
the second part. Finally note that the di¤erence between RHS and LHS of (26)
can be written as
3(1  )(vh   vl)
2 + (3  (1 + 2   22))(vl + (vh   vl))
4
(1 + 4 + 2)(vh + (1  )vl)4
For a given value of vl, the derivative of this with respect to vh   vl is positive,
which proves the last part.
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Proposition 2 has an interesting interpretation. Points 1 and 3 are related
to the degree of market uncertainty and the amount of information that the
entrepreneur can recieve when learning the market demand with tokens. Indeed
if  = 0 or 1 the amount of information is zero since the demand is deterministic.
The same holds if  is either very small or very large because there is a large
chance that the demand is either very high or low. However when  is in the
middle the degree of uncertainty is highest since the demand can go either way.
The last point is also related to information since a larger the di¤erence between
vh and vl implies a higher risk from misvaluing the demand. Point 2 implies
that securtiy tokens are more sensitive to the value of the discount factor. If it
is high then the e¤ect of security tokens as an incentive device is diminished.
The next section show that if the rm is able to issue tokens with prot
rights it can improve its overall outcome.
4 Utility Tokens With Prot Rights
Suppose that the rm can issue utility tokens with prot rights. In this case the
rm selects the fraction of equity  that belong to tokenholders and sells tokens
to miners. After that, the entrepreneur and miners provide their e¤orts. Miners
sell their tokens on the secondary market. The platform is launched for innite
number of periods. At the beginning of each period n, the rm sells tokens
to the public. Then the rm determines the level of production qn and pays
dividend dn to tokenholders. Produced items are then exchanged for tokens.
The timing of events for utility tokens is present in Figure 5.
-
t = 0 t = 1 :::t = n:::
s s s
Firm selects  and
sells tokens to miners
p0 is determined
The entrepreneur
selects e1
and miners select e2
Miners sell their tokens on
the secondary market for
the price p1
The platform is launched
The rm determines q1
Products are sold to
the public for tokens
The entrepreneur sells tokens
for the price pn and learns vn
dividends dn are paid
The rm determines qn
Tokens are exchanged for products
for the price Tn per item (in tokens)
Figure 5. The sequence of events with moral hazard and market
uncertainty for utility tokens with prot rights.
Lemma 4. Without moral hazard and when the demand is known, the
entreprneurs prot equals v
2
4 .
17
Proof. See Appendix 2.
This result is not surprising since without market imperfections, the rms
prot is the same as it is with utility tokens or security tokens (see Lemma 1).
Proposition 3. Under moral hazard and demand uncertainty, the entrepre-
neurs prot equals:
3(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
642
(28)
Proof. See Appendix 3.
The amount of earnings is positively correlated with vh, vl and  and nega-
tively correlated with .
Proposition 4. The entrepreneurs earnings in case the rm issues utility
tokens with prot rights are higher than they are under security tokens or utility
tokens without prot rights.
Proof. We need to compare (24), (25) and (28). First note that (28) is
greater than (25). Indeed the di¤erence between them can be written as
3(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
642
 
3(vh + (1  )vl)
4
642
=
32(1  )2(vh   vl)
4
642
> 0
Now compare (28) and (24). The di¤erence between them can be written as
3(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
642
 
(1 + 4 + 2)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
=
(1  )2(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
642(1 + )2
which is positive.
5 Implications
Our paper has several implications for an entrepreneurial rms choice of token
design.
Proposition 2 implies that ICO is preferred to STO if the market uncertainty
increases or the discount rate decreases. Although this prediction has not been
tested directly it is consistent with the spirit of Amsden and Schweizer (2018).
They show in their sample of 1,009 projects between 2015 and 2017 that ICO
success depends negatively on venture uncertainty and positively on venture
quality.
Proposition 3 implies that utility tokens with prot rights dominate security
tokens and utility tokens without prot rights. The rst part is consistent with
Adhami et al (2017). In a subsample of 253 campaigns, Adhami et al (2017)
document higher returns when tokens allow contributors to access a specic
service including prot rights. The second part has not been tested sofar.
Our model is also consistent with the existence of a positive correlation
between the platforms quality and the amount raised during an ICO (see, for
example, Ante, Sandner and Fiedler (2018)). Indeed, it follows from (12) and
(13) that the amount raised during the ICO equals:
p0 =
(2 + )E2
2(1 + )2
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which means that p0 is positively correlated with E.
6 The Model Extensions And Robustness
Other types of moral hazard. In our model, the moral hazard takes place be-
cause, for example, the particpants equity stake in the rm is reduced while
his individual e¤ort is costly and this cost is not shared. This approach is very
common in nancing literature (starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and
typically creates an agency cost of equity nancing. There are many di¤erent
ways to analyze moral hazard issues, for example, to explicitely assume that
the entreprneurs can "steal" money from the rm. In this case the entrepreneur
trades-o¤ private benets from "ine¢cient" investments and the cost incurred in
the case of the rms bankruptcy. The entrepreneurs objective function can be
made more complicated by including, for example, some bonuses from "good"
investments. One can also consider an alternative function for a joint result of
e¤orts provided by entrepreneurs and miners. At this point, however, we do not
see which parts of our ideas can be a¤ected qualitatively without singicantly
complicating the models solutions so we leave it for future research.
Mixed nancing and more types of nancing. Unlike capital structure lit-
erature, where a debt/equity mix is a very common strategy (as opposed to
pure equity or pure debt nancing),12 simultaneously issuing di¤erent types of
tokens has not shown to be common. Nevertheless, if mixed nancing is allowed
in period 1, most results will stand. In fact, qualitatively if the rm decidies
to issue two types of tokens (utility tokens and security tokens) the results
are very similar to issuing utility tokens with prot sharing rights. Note that
this strategy seems to be quite popular in practice. For example the CEO of
Minthealth Samir Damiani stated the following in one of his interviews: "You
will absolutely see the rise of the security token. In fact, industry analysts and
leaders predict that 25% ($20 Trillion) of the existing global equity market of
$80 Trillion will be security tokens in the next 3 to 5 years, driven primarily by
the massive inux of institutional capital. The security token is an incredible
tool for companies as they enable stakeholders to participate in the growth of a
company and reap the benets of its success in an SEC compliant manner.....As
for the novel dual token structure, we see this as necessary for our company,
and likely will become more common in the future. Several industries can ben-
et from incentivizing consumers. A growing spectrum of industries already
have loyalty programs (think Amazon, CVS, Amex etc). As more companies
leverage Blockchain, it is likely the fruits of a dual token structure will become
more apparent and widely leveraged."13 These ideas are very similar to the ones
12For a review of capital structure literature see, among others, Harris and Raviv (1991) or
Miglo (2011). For a traditional analysis of the capital structure of internet companies see, for
example, Miglo, Lee and Liang (2014).
13https://blog.polymath.network/minthealth-and-polymath-bring-the-rst-healthcare-
security-token-to-revolutionize-healthcare-a36884f17e4e
https://hackernoon.com/how-to-do-an-sto-an-exclusive-interview-with-the-founder-of-
minthealth-ba24be0c6025
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suggested in this paper. In fact, Minthealth has decided to issue two types of
tokens. and its motivations are quite similar to the ideas in this article. Dual
token structure is denitely an interesting direction for future research.
Two stages. One can assume that the rm issues tokens in two stages. For
example in case of utiltiy tokens the rm sells a fraction t of tokens to miners
and then 1   t to the public. As far as we can see, the results will not change
with the introduction of this assumption however if one introduces for example
two development periods in the model with two di¤erent e¤orts in each period (a
dynamic extension of the model) the results will change at least quantitatively.
It is hard to predict the consequnes of such a chnage so it is di¢cult to judge if
it is a promising avenue for future research.
Voting rights. One can futher extend the model by allowing the rm to
develop more than one project in the initial stage with di¤erent utilities for the
entrepreneur, the miners and the public and let tokenhoders particpate in the
decision-making process etc.
Asymmetric information. In our paper we focus on ex-post asymmetric
information, i.e an environment where platform quality depends on the e¤ort of
its deloppers. One can consider a model with ex-ante asymmetric information
where the entrepreneur initially has some signals about its platform and would
like to signal it to the market via tokens issue. It is an intersting avenue for
future analysis but it is beyond the scope of our model.14
7 Conclusions
This article is the rst one that o¤ers a model of the choice between ICO and
STO for an innovative rm looking to fund the development of its platform.
Existing literature usually focuses on ICOs. Our paper is also the rst one that
has a theoretical model of STO as well as an analysis of utility tokens with
prot sharing rights. The topic is a highly growing area among researchers
and practioners. Our model is based on two important features of innovative
rms dealing with the development of FinTech related products. First, moral
hazard problems related to the developmet of platforms. The reason for this
is that the quality of a platform is is highly uncertain to participants and the
token design can a¤ect the incentives of the parties invloved. Secondly, tokens
have secondary markets unlike venture capital investments or crowdfunding. We
study how the design of tokens can help the rm learn information about the
demand by observing token price on the secondary market. We nd that utility
tokens are prefered to secutiy tokens when the degree of uncertainty is high. We
also nd that security tokens may be prefered if the moral hazard problem is
important. We then analyze the role of utility tokens with prot sharing rights
and nd that these tokens are more protable for the entrepreneur compared
to utility tokens without prot rights and security tokens. Most of our models
14See, for example, Belleamme et al (2014), Miglo et al (2019) and Miglo (2020b) for the
analysis of the role of asymmetric information in crowdfunding.
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predictions are new and have not yet been tested but they seem to be consistent
to some extent with recent empirical evidence, eg. Adhami et al (2017).
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Appendix
Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 1. Utility tokens. Similarly to sections 3.1
and 3.2, we get that the present value of the entrepreneurs prots equals
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
 
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
In period 1, the expected value of tokens sold by miners equals:
p1 =
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
In period 0, the entrepreneur choses e1 to maximize
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
 
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
 
e21
2
Taking into account (1), this equals
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )
4
 
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )
4(1 + )
 
e21
2
(29)
The optimal e1 equals:
e1 =
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
(30)
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The miners chose e2 to maximize:
p2
1 + 
 
e22
2
=
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
 
e22
2
Taking into account (1), this equals
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )
4(1 + )
 
e22
2
(31)
The optimal e2 equals:
e2 =
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4(1 + )
(32)
(30) and (32) imply
e1 + e2 =
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
This implies that (29) equals:
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
162
 
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
16(1 + )
 
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
=
(1 + 2)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
And (31) equals
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
16(1 + )
 
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
32(1 + )2
=
(2 + )(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
32(1 + )2
When selling tokens, the entrepreneurs total prot is:
 = p0 +
(1 + 2)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
subject to
p0 =
(2 + )(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
32(1 + )2
It implies
 =
(2 + )(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
32(1 + )2
+
(1 + 2)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
=
=
(1 + 4 + 2)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
(33)
Security tokens. Similarly to sections 3.1 and 3.2, we get that the present
value of the entrepreneurs prots equals
(1  )(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
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In period 1, the rm choses e1 to maximize
(1  )(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
 
e21
2
Taking into account (??), this equals
(1  )(e1 + e2)(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
 
e21
2
(34)
Optimal e1 equals:
e1 =
(1  )(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
(35)
Miners chose e2 to maximize:
(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
 
e22
2
=
(e1 + e2)(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
 
e22
2
Optimal e2 equals:
e2 =
(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
(36)
(35) and (36) imply
e1 + e2 =
(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
It imply that (34) equals:
(1  )(e1 + e2)v
2
4
 
e21
2
=
(1  )(1 + )(vh + (1  )vl)
4
322
And (??) equals
(e1 + e2)(vh + (1  )vl)
2
4
 
e22
2
=
(2  )(vh + (1  )vl)
4
322
When choosing , the entrepreneur maximizes:
 = p0 +
(1  )(1 + )(vh + (1  )vl)
4
322
subject to
p0 =
(2  )(vh + (1  )vl)
4
322
It implies
 =
(2  )(vh + (1  )vl)
4
322
+
(1  )(1 + )(vh + (1  )vl)
4
322
=
=
(1 + 2  22)(vh + (1  )vl)
4
322
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Optimal
 =
1
2
and entrepreneurs prot equals
 =
3(vh + (1  )vl)
4
642
(37)
Appendix 2. Proof of Lemma 4. We begin the solution by backwards. Con-
sider operational stage. In period n there are qn items produced. Tokenholders
use their tokens to buy products. Equilibrium is determined by the following
conditions: 1) The entrepreneur maximizes his prot in tokens, which equals
qnTn; 2) demand:
qn = v   Pn (38)
where the cost of service for the public (Pn):
Pn = Tnpn  
dn
qn
(39)
Here dn is the dividend paid by the rm. We assume that each period the
rm distributes its prot pro-rata according to number of tokens per holder.
Taking into account (38) and (39), we have that the entrepreneurs objective
function can be written as (v qn)qn
pn
. Optimal q equals
qn =
v
2
and the entrepreneurs prot equals:
v2
4
Also note that we have:
Pn =
v
2
Tn =
2
v
dn = 
v2
4
pn =
Pn + dn=qn
Tn
=
v(v + v)
4
The present value of the entrepreneurs prots equals
v2
4
 
v(v + v)
4(1 + )
In period 2, miners sell their tokens on the secondary market for the value:
p1 =
v(v + v)
4
25
When choosing , the entrepreneur maximizes:
 = p0 +
v2
4
 
v(v + v)
4(1 + )
subject to
p0 =
v(v + v)
4(1 + )
It implies
 =
v(v + v)
4(1 + )
+
v2
4
 
v(v + v)
4(1 + )
=
v2
4
(40)
Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 3. In period n there are qn items produced.
Tokenholders use their tokens to buy products. Equilibrium is determined by
the following conditions: 1) the entrepreneur maximizes his prot in tokens,
which equals qnTn;
2) demand:
qn = vj   Pn (41)
where the cost of the product to the public (Pn):
Pn = Tnpn  
dn
qn
(42)
Taking into account (41) and (42), we have that the entrepreneurs objective
function can be written as
(vj qn)qn
pn
. Optimal q equals
qn =
vj
2
and the entrepreneurs prot equals:
v2j
4
Also note that we have:
Pn =
vj
2
Tn =
2
vj
pn =
vj(vj + vj)
4
The present value of the entrepreneurs prots equals
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
 
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )(1 + )
4(1 + )
In period 1, miners sell their tokens on the secondary market for the value:
p1 =
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )(1 + )
4
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In period 0, the rm choses e1 to maximize
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
 
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )(1 + )
4(1 + )
 
e21
2
Taking into account (1), this equals
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )
4
 
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )(1 + )
4(1 + )
 
e21
2
(43)
Optimal e1 equals:
e1 =
(1  )(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
4(1 + )
(44)
Miners chose e2 to maximize:
p1
1 + 
 
e22
2
=
(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )(1 + )
4(1 + )
 
e22
2
Taking into account (1), this equals
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )(1 + )
4(1 + )
 
e22
2
Optimal e2 equals:
e2 =
(1 + )(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
4(1 + )
(35) and (36) imply
e1 + e2 =
v2h + (1  )v
2
l
4
It imply that (43) equals:
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )
4
 
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )(1 + )
4(1 + )
 
e21
2
=
=
(1 + 2   22   22)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
And (44) equals
(e1 + e2)(v
2
h + (1  )v
2
l )(1 + )
4(1 + )
 
e22
2
=
(1 + )(2 +    )(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
32(1 + )2
When selling tokens, the entrepreneurs total prot is:
 = p0 +
(1 + 2   22   22)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
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subject to
p0 =
(1 + )(2 +    )(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
32(1 + )2
It implies
 =
(1 + )(2 +    )(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
32(1 + )2
+
(1 + 2   22   22)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
=
=
(1 + 4 + 2 + 2   22   222)(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
322(1 + )2
Optimal
 =
1  
2
And the entrepreneurs prot equals:
 =
3(v2h + (1  )v
2
l )
2
642
(45)
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